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ARTICLE
SEEN AND HEARD: A DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL SPEECH
DmitryBamt
I. INTRODUCTION

The ethical code for federal judges,' just like its state counterparts,2
prohibits judges from engaging in political activities, including endorsing or
opposing candidates for public office. 3 These restrictions on judicial
politicking, intended to preserve both the reality and the appearance of
judicial integrity, independence, and impartiality, have been in place for
decades. 4 This ban on political activity reflects more than a mere ethical
rule. Although the Code of Conduct for United States Judges does not apply
to the Supreme Court,5 Supreme Court Justices have long followed the
norm that they do not take sides, at least publicly,6 in partisan political
elections. Civics courses across the country teach students that the judiciary
is not a political branch,7 and senators continue to insist in confirmation

t Dmitry Barn, Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law.
1. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 2014).

2. State judicial ethics rules, just like the federal Code of Conduct for United States
Judges, generally mirror the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Nearly every state has
adopted its own version of the ABA Model Code. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM.
BAR Ass'N 2007). For the purposes of this Article, there are no relevant differences between
the Model Code and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.
3. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(l)(b) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2007);
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.l(A)(3) (AM. BARAss'N 2007).
4. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2007) ("A Judge
should refrain from political activity inappropriate to his judicial office.").
5. Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards,
2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1188 (2011) (discussing the proposals to extend the Code of Conduct
to the Supreme Court).
6. As will be discussed in greater detail below, Justices have certainly taken sides on the
outcomes of elections in private. For example, following the 2000 election when Al Gore was
thought to have won the presidency, Justice O'Connor allegedly remarked that "this is
terrible." Michael Isikoff, The Truth Behind the Pillars, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 24, 2000),
http://www.newsweek.com/truth-behind-pillars-155985 (quoting two witnesses).
7. See, e.g., Susan D. Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: Criminal Defendants and the Short
End of the Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REv. 597, 604 (2007) ("Although we tell our seventh
grade civics students that the judiciary is the independent branch of government-the one
branch that is free to exercise its own judgment without navigating the shifting plates of
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hearings that they are looking for judges who do not bring their politics into
their judicial decision-making. 8 Of course, the Justices may be called to
decide cases involving candidates for office,9 but their opinions in those
cases are official judicial statements on the legal merits of the candidates'
claims rather than informal expressions of their own personal views. And
while elected state judges' 0 have some leeway to engage in limited political
activities associated with their own candidacy," the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court have consistently remained on the sidelines in
contested partisan elections. Sure, the average voter could hypothesize
about what Justice Scalia thought of then-candidate Barack Obama when he
was running for the presidency in 2008 and 2012, but we were ultimately
left to reach our own conclusions. 12
That is why the events of July 2016 were so surprising. With the 2016
presidential election less than four months away, Supreme Court Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg shocked everyone when she bluntly spoke out against
the Republican presidential nominee, and the ultimate winner of the

political tectonics that move the executive and legislative branches-the truth is that whether
judges are appointed or elected, becoming a judge 'takes political support."').
8. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Sen. Orrin Hatch on the Supreme Court: 'Activist Justices
Have Rewritten Our Laws', WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01 /30/ sen-orrin-hatch-on-the-supreme-court-activist
justices-have-rewritten-our-laws/?utm_term=.963dfl f594ec ("It is not a Justice's role to
make or change laws by imposing his own policy preferences instead of what Congress
actually passed. It is not her role to prejudge issues by looking beyond the text of the law to
consider her personal views and feelings.").
9. See, e.g., Ohio Democratic Party v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 15
(Nov. 7, 2016) (order denying application to vacate stay); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
10. Approximately ninety percent of American judges face the electorate either to attain,
or to keep, their jobs. See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: PURSUING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 3 (2012) (summarizing the prevalence of judicial
elections in the United States).
11. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2(B), (C) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2007)
(permitting elected judges, among other things, to "attend political gatherings" and
"contribute to a political organization"). Just like their federal counterparts, even elected
state judges may not endorse candidates for office. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r.
4.l(A)(3) (AM. BARASS'N 2007).
12. Justice Scalia was highly critical of the Obama administration in his opinions. See,
e.g., S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in
Immigration Federalism, 44 Aruz. ST. L.J. 1431, 1482 (2012) (discussing Justice Scalia's
criticism of President Obama's immigration policies). Judge Posner described Scalia's
comments as "inflammatory." Id. However, as far as I am aware, none of the justices on the
current court ever supported or opposed a candidate for office in the course of an election.
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election, Donald Trump. 13 On multiple occasions, she expressed her disdain
for Trump in no uncertain terms, calling Trump a "faker," criticizing
Trump's failure to release his tax returns, and even joking that her husband
would have suggested moving to New Zealand if Trump were to be elected
president. 14 Given the ethical rules and the long-standing norms of judicial
behavior, these were jarring statements from a sitting Supreme Court
Justice; we are not used to hearing Justices make such blatantly political
(and partisan) remarks. After all, despite volumes of evidence to the
contrary, judges and Justices continue to refer to themselves as the
"apolitical" branch of government 15 -as mere "umpires" in a political game
played by the elected branches. 16
Immediately, there was a near-unanimous outcry against the propriety of
Ginsburg's comments, ultimately leading her to apologize.17 The chorus of
critics included pundits, the press, numerous politicians, and Donald
Trump himself. 18 It was not just conservatives who rebuked her
statements. 19 Despite her near-mythical status in progressive circles,20
among the critics were some of Justice Ginsburg's biggest supporters on the
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (contrasting the
"judiciary and the two political branches"); see also Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding A Crown
Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer Criticism of Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 703, 711
(1997) ("While the judiciary, as part of government, is fully accountable to the public, in this
respect there are crucial differences between the judiciary and the other two 'political'
branches of government.").
16. Chief Justice Roberts famously used the umpire analogy during his confirmation
hearing. Many scholars have rejected the umpire analogy. See, e.g., Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The
Justice Commissioner: Benching The Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 113 (2010)
(critiquing the umpire analogy).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part II.
19. Many conservatives did rebuke her. See Ed Whelan, Ginsburg Continues to Slam
Trump, NAT'L REVIEW (July 12, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/437717/
ginsburg-trump; Josh Blackman, Inglorious RBG, JOSH BLACKMAN'S BLOG (July 10, 2016),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2016/07I10/inglorious-rbg/ ("Ruth Bader Ginsburg has lost
it. Her recent comments are absolutely beyond the pale-even for her outrageous self. The
other justices should hold an intervention, and tell her to be quiet or step down. This isn't
funny anymore.").
20. Justice Ginsburg's cult-like status among liberals is exemplified by the adoption and
use of the "Notorious RBG" memes. See Dahlia Lithwick, Justice LOLZ Grumpycat Notorious
R.B.G.: How a Gentle Supreme Court Justice Became a Badass Gansta Internet Meme, SLATE
(Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/ doublex/2015/03/notorious_r_b_g_
history_the_origins_and_meaning_of_ruth_bader_ginsburg_s.html.
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left. 21 Reliably leftist Supreme Court commentators, legal academics, and
other Ginsburg admirers suddenly sided with Donald Trump, 22 perhaps for
the first time in the entire election cycle. In an election that saw little
bipartisan agreement on almost anything, nearly everyone seemed to agree
that Justice Ginsburg's statements violated ethical rules and norms.23 And to
many, this was not even a close call, with commentators describing the
ethical question as "a softball" that left no doubt that "Ginsburg's ...
[statements] were inappropriate."24
This Article examines whether Ginsburg's many critics were right. I
conclude that Justice Ginsburg's comments indeed violated long
established judicial norms, as well as the canons of judicial ethics. 25 But
contrary to conventional wisdom, I suggest that the norms themselves may
be built on a shaky foundation and grounded in long-abandoned myths
about the judicial role and judicial decision-making. The traditional
restraints on Supreme Court Justices expressing their own strongly-held
political views does not further, or at least does not significantly further, any
of the important goals generally served by the ethics codes. 26 While Justice
Ginsburg's comments, and comments like hers, may change the way the
people view the Court and its Justices, their mere utterance causes little
damage to the reputation and standing of the federal judiciary generally, or
the Supreme Court in particular. In addition, stifling judicial speech
disserves the American people by misleading them about judges and

21. See infra Part IL
22. See infra Part IL
23. Erwin Chemerinsky was one of the few high-profile defenders of Justice Ginsburg.

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Has Nothing to Apologize For in Her Criticism
of Donald Trump, L.A. TIMES (July 16, 2016), www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe
chemerinsky-ginsburg-trump-comments-20160718-snap-story.html. But his defense focused
on Ginsburg's First Amendment right to express views rather than on the ethical propriety of
her statements. Id. In this Article, I set aside the First Amendment issues, as a number of
other scholars have considered whether judges have a First Amendment right to engage in
political speech. See, e.g., Wendy R. Weiser, Regulating Judges' Political Activity After White,
68 ALB. L. REV. 651 (2005).
24. See Roger Parloff, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Did Step In It - Now Get Over It, FORTUNE
(June 14, 2016), www.fortune.com/2016/07/14/ruth-bader-ginsburg-donald-trump-comments/.
25. As I explain below, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to Supreme Court
Justices, although the Justices treat the Code as strongly persuasive authority and generally
follow its mandates.
26. I focus here on such statements by Supreme Court Justices only. As I show below,
not only are political statements by Supreme Court Justices less problematic, but political
statements by Supreme Court Justices have greater value than similar statements by lower
courts judges. See infra Part Ill; Part IV.
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judging and concealing potentially important heuristic information from
the electorate. When judges speak, people listen, and judicial speech, even
political or partisan judicial speech, can educate and inform the public
about constitutional meaning and the role of the judiciary. In other words, I
suggest that we lose more than we gain when ethical rules muzzle Justices
from expressing their sincerely-held political views. 27
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part II, I begin by briefly
summarizing the context and the nature of Justice Ginsburg's statements, as
well as her subsequent apology. Parts III and IV then set out the two
primary ethical objections to Ginsburg's comments. 28
Part III examines the first critique, which relates to judicial impartiality
and the appearance of impartiality. Critics accused Justice Ginsburg of
showing bias (or the appearance of bias) against Donald Trump. But upon
closer examination, I conclude that the impartiality concerns stemming
from such judicial speech are minor. In fact, as the Court itself has
explained, mere expression of strongly-held political beliefs (even about
issues that judges are likely to face on the bench) does not implicate judicial

27. In this Article, I do not address whether society has a general interest in creating a
judiciary without strongly held political views. Whether such a system is feasible or
commendable are beyond the scope of the Article. Rather, my focus is solely on the ban of
political speech by judges-the mere expression of what judges are already thinking.
28. There is a generic critique that Ginsburg's actions create the appearance of
impropriety. See, e.g., Times Editorial Board, Ginsburg's Criticism of Trump is
Understandable but Injudicious, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2016), www.latimes.com/opinion/
editorials/la-ed-ginsburg-trump-20160713-snap-story.html (describing the ethical code's
"general statement that judges should 'avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety"'). However, a close look at this objection makes it clear that the impropriety is
based largely on the partisan nature of her comments or the appearance of impartiality. See,
e.g., id. (arguing that the appearance of impropriety is created because the public may
perceive that Ginsburg is not impartial towards Trump in litigation involving Trump).
Therefore, I focus on the specific ban on judges engaging in partisan activity rather than the
general requirement that judges avoid conduct that creates the appearance of impropriety. A
related objection, although one I have not seen made in this context, may be that Ginsburg's
comments are inappropriate because she is lending the prestige of her office of a candidate in
the election. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2007); Steve
Lubet, Chemerinsky on Ginsberg, FACULTY LOUNGE (July 12, 2016), www.thefaculty
lounge.org/2016/07/chemerinsky-on-ginsburg-2.html ("Ginsburg speaks with the authority
of a Supreme Court justice, and she might therefore influence voters."). That too, I believe, is
a species of the partisan-political nature of Ginsburg's comments. In fact, Steve Lubet, after
setting forth this problem, explains that "[t]his compromises the neutrality of the Court, and
threatens to reduce it to another political branch of government." Id. In addition, as I will
explain in Part IV, the heuristic function of her comments should be viewed as a positive
rather than as a negative.

770

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:765

impartiality. 29 And although here Ginsburg spoke about a specific person
rather than an issue, she did nothing more than tell us what was on her
mind. To the extent that simply holding those views alone demonstrates
bias and requires recusal, litigants benefit from the public expression of
those views because this expression can offer them the information they
need for a potential recusal motion against the judge.
Part IV looks at the second criticism, which centers on the political and
partisan nature of Justice Ginsburg's comments. Indeed, it is hard to see
Ginsburg's comments as anything other than an endorsement of a
candidate for political office. This is the stronger of the two accusations.
Long-established norms counsel against judicial comment on elections,
candidates in those elections, or blatantly partisan statements endorsing (or
criticizing) an individual running for office. And if judges are supposed to
remain non-partisan and apolitical, then Ginsburg's comments would
appear to be indefensible. But once again, on closer examination, these
purported harms are largely illusory, at least with respect to Supreme Court
Justices. After all, much of the Court's work is political in nature. 30 The
Justices are selected through a highly partisan process-a process focused in
large part on the ideology of the candidate-and arrive at the Court with
(and maybe even because of) strongly-held political and ideological views.
Ginsburg's comments only confirm the reality that Supreme Court Justices
already have strongly-held political views that go along with their long
established political connections and relationships. 31 Scholars across many
disciplines have shown that politics, ideology, and many other factors play a
role in judicial decision-making. 32 Thus, the norm prohibiting judges from
expressing their political viewpoint merely conceals from the people the
political nature of serving as a Supreme Court Justice. In light of these
factors, the Court is unlikely to suffer significant harm if Justices confirm
that they are human beings with partisan leanings (or disabuse those people
who continue to believe that politics and law occupy entirely separate

29. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776-77 (2002).
30. See generally ERIC SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT Is NOT A
COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES (2012).
31. For example, see Justice Scalia's opinion explaining his non-recusal following a duck
hunting trip with Vice President Cheney while a lawsuit against Cheney was pending before
the Court. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 124 S. Ct. 1391 (2004)
(Scalia, J., mem.). Justice Scalia explained that the Justices are Washington insiders who have
many friends within the other branches of government. Id. at 1394-95. This is particularly
true for Justices who served in the other branches of government before joining the federal
judiciary.
32. See infra Part IV.
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spheres). Part IV also highlights some of the benefits of judicial speech,
including the educational and heuristic value that partisan judicial speech
can serve.
Not only do Ginsburg's comments cause little real harm to the judiciary,
but judicial speech may have significant educational benefits for the public.
Therefore, I conclude that while Justice Ginsburg's actions violated the
ethical rules and the ethical norms, such restrictions on judicial speech, at
least judicial speech by Supreme Court Justices, may do more harm than
good.
II. THE COMMENTS

In a span of three days, in three separate interviews, Justice Ginsburg
expressed her views on the presidential election. It started when the New
York Times published a story on July 11, 2016, quoting Ginsburg as saying:
"I can't imagine what this place would be - I can't imagine what the
country would be - with Donald Trump as our president .... For the
country, it could be four years. For the court, it could be - I don't even
want to contemplate that." 33 In the same interview, she also hinted that were
her husband still alive, he might have suggested moving to New Zealand if
Trump won the election. 34
Was this a momentary lapse in judgment? Justice Ginsburg quickly made
clear that this was not merely an off-the-cuff comment. In a second
interview with the Associated Press, Ginsburg lamented that she did not
want to even consider the possibility of a Trump presidency. 35 She also said
that she believed her fears would not come to fruition because Hillary
Clinton would likely be our next president. 36
Finally, in an interview with CNN on July 12, Ginsburg did not back
down. Instead, she doubled down with the most pointed attack yet. "He is a
faker," she said. "He has no consistency about him. He says whatever comes
into his head at the moment. He really has an ego .... How has he gotten

33. Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Critiques Latest
Term, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/07/ll/us/politics/ruth-bader
ginsburg- no- fan-o f-donald- trump-critiques-latest- term.html?_r=O.
34. Id.

35. Joan Biskupic, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Calls Trump a 'Faker,' He Says She
Should Resign, CNN (July 13, 2016), www.cnn.com/2016/07/12/politics/justice-ruth-bader
ginsburg-donald-trump-faker/ ("I can't imagine what this place would be-can't imagine
what the country would be-with Donald Trump as our president.").
36. Id.
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away with not turning over his tax returns? The press seems to be very
gentle with him on that." 37
Her comments unleashed a torrent of criticism. Criticism from the left. 38
Criticism from the right. 39 Criticism from the media. 4° Criticism from legal
academics. 41 Criticism from politicians. 42 In short, in a rare moment of
bipartisan solidarity, Ginsburg managed to unite those who are usually her
biggest supporters and her most ardent opponents in excoriating her
statements.
Donald Trump himself responded in the signature Donald Trump style:
on Twitter. The day after Ginsburg's remarks on CNN, Trump tweeted,
"Justice Ginsburg of the U.S. Supreme Court has embarrassed all by making

37. Id.
38. For example, Jeffrey Toobin, CNN's legal analyst, said that Ginsburg's remarks were
"very inappropriate for a Supreme Court Justice." Interview with Jeffrey Toobin, CNN's
Senior Legal Analyst, CNN (July 13, 2016), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/1607/13/cnr.Ol.html. See also Jeffrey Toobin, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Slam of
Trump, CNN (July 13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/12/opinions/ruth-bader
ginsburg-trump-toobin/.
39. Prominent conservative analyst Ed Whelan said that Ginsburg's comments were
indefensible. "I think this exceeds the others in terms of her indiscretions .... I am not aware
of any justice ever expressing views on the merits or demerits of a presidential candidate in
the midst of the campaign." See Aaron Blake, In Bashing Donald Trump, Some Say Ruth
Bader Ginsburg Just Crossed a Very Important Line, WASH. POST (July 11, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/the-fix/wp/2016/07I11 /in-bashing-donald-trump
some-say-ruth-bader-ginsburg-just-crossed-a-very-important-line/?utm_term=.Oe4aal 6b25
ed.
40. The New York Times Editorial Board published its opinion that Ginsburg's
comments were inappropriate. See Times Editorial Board, Donald Trump is Right About
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/
opinion/donald-trump-is-right-about-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg.html?_r=O.
41. There are countless example here, including leading voices in election law (Rick Hasen) and
legal ethics (Steve Lubet, Stephen Gillers). See Stephen Gillers, It's Clearly Not Rightfor Justices to Say
Which Candidate They Support, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate
/2016/07I12/ can-a-supreme-court-justice-denounce-a-candidate/ its-clearly-not-right- for-justices
to-say-which-candidate-they-su pport; Rick Hasen & Dahlia Lithwick, The Real Reason Why Judges
Should Keep Quiet About Elections, SIATE (July 19, 2016), http://www.slate.com/artides/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/07/ruth_bader_ginsburg_s_trump_remarks_will_have_long
_lasting_effects.html; Steve Lubet, Chemerinsky on Ginsburg, THE FACULTY LOUNGE (July 12, 2016),
www.thefacultylounge.org/2016/07Ichemerinsky-on-ginsburg-2.html.
42. Among the many political figures that criticized Ginsburg's comments were Paul Ryan,
Marco Rubio, and Mitch McConnell. See, e.g., Manu Raju & Theodore Schleifer, Top Republicans
Criticize Ruth Bader Ginsburg But Don't Back Trump's Call for Her to Resign, CNN (July 13, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/12/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-reaction/. See infra Part II.
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very dumb political statements about me. Her mind is shot - resign!" 43
Following Justice Ginsburg's lead, he, too, doubled down the following day,
tweeting, "Is Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg going to
apologize to me for her misconduct? Big mistake by an incompetent
judge!"44 In the New York Times, Trump said, "I think it's highly
inappropriate that a United States Supreme Court judge gets involved in a
political campaign, frankly .... I think it's a disgrace to the court, and I
think she should apologize to the court. I couldn't believe it when I saw it." 45
In response to the criticism, Justice Ginsburg did, indeed, apologize. On
July 14, she issued a statement saying that "[o]n reflection, my recent
remarks in response to press inquiries were ill-advised and I regret making
them .... Judges should avoid commenting on a candidate for public office.
In the future I will be more circumspect."46 She also told Nina Totenberg: "I
did something I should not have done." 47 And with that apology, the
controversy disappeared from public view. 48 Despite limited pockets of
43. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 13, 2016, 12:54 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/ status/753090242203283457?lang=en.
44. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 13, 2016, 3:26 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/ status/753354905897668608?lang=en. In two later
tweets, Trump said "Even the @NYTimes and @WashingtonPost Editorial Boards
condemned Justice Ginsburg for her ethical and legal breach. What was she thinking?" and
"If I win the Presidency, we will swamp [sic] Justice Ginsburg with real judges and real legal
opinions!" See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 13, 2016, 3:28 PM),
h ttps:// twitter.com/ realdonaldtrump/ status/753355507721646080.
45. Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Calls Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
Remarks a 'Disgrace to the Court', N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/
07I13/ us/politics/ ruth-bader-ginsburg-donald-trump-criticism.html ?hp&action=click&pg
type=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top
news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=O.
46. See Robert Barnes, Ginsburg Expresses Regret for Remarks Criticizing Trump, WASH.
POST. (July 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ ginsburg-expresses-regret
over-remarks-criticizing-trump/2016/07/14/f53687bc-49cc-11e6-bdb9-70168797 4517_story.
html?utm_term=.b01648d9eabd.
47. Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg Apologizes for Trump Comments,
NPR (July 15, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/07I15/ 486130165/supreme-court-justice
ginsburg-apologizes-for- trup-comments.
48. Donald Trump once more brought up Ginsburg's comments during the third
presidential debate. He said: "Something happened recently where Justice Ginsburg made
some very inappropriate statements toward me and toward a tremendous number of people,
many, many millions of people that I represent, and she was forced to apologize and
apologize she did. But these were statements that should never ever have been made." See full
transcript of the third presidential debate at Third Presidential Debate Live Transcript
Clinton Trump, VOX (Oct. 20, 2016), www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/10
I 19/ 13336894/third-presidential-debate-live-transcript-clinton-trump.
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support for Ginsburg's comments, the near-unanimous consensus seems to
be that Ginsburg stepped over the line and that her comments were
inappropriate.
Ill. THE IMPARTIALITY CRITIQUE

Why did so many people find Ginsburg's comments problematic, setting
off a torrent of controversy? Despite the large number of critics, most of the
criticisms fall into one of two categories. The first critique is that Ginsburg's
comments were improper because they violated the rule that judges must
remain impartial, or at the very least preserve the appearance of
impartiality. The second critique is that Ginsburg's comments were
improper because she engaged in blatantly political and partisan behavior,
contrary to the requirement that judges remain independent and
nonpartisan.
A. Actual Bias

One of the primary accusations against Ginsburg is that her statements
evidence bias against Donald Trump. For example, the New York Times
Editorial Board wrote that Ginsburg's comments "call her own
commitment to impartiality into question." 49 Louis Virelli, an expert on
judicial recusal, said that Ginsberg's comments "could be seen as grounds
for her to recuse herself from cases involving a future Trump
administration."50 Rick Hasen, one of the nation's preeminent election law
scholars, similarly examined whether the "comments would cause a
reasonable person to question the impartiality of the justice."51 House
Speaker Paul Ryan got right to the heart of the impartiality concern, saying
that "[f]or someone on the Supreme Court who is going to be calling balls

49. See James Bennet et al., Donald Trump Is Right About Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/opinion/donald-trump-is-right
about-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg.html.
50. See Aaron Blake, In Bashing Donald Trump, Some Say Ruth Bader Ginsburg Just
Crossed a Very Important Line, WASH. POST. (July 11, 2016), www.washingtonpost.com/
news/ the-fix/wp/2016/07 / l l /in-bashing-donald-trump-some-say-ruth-bader-ginsburg-just
crossed-a-very-important-line/?utm_term=.b3ll88764c l 1. I, too, made a similar suggestion.
See Cristian Farias, Did Ruth Bader Ginsburg Cross The Line With Her Donald Trump
Comments?, BUFFINGTON POST (July 11, 2016), www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ruth-bader
ginsburg-donald-trump_us_5783af3de4b0ledea78ea5c8 (comments added by Dmitry Barn).
51. Rick Hasen, Do Justice Ginsburg's Comments on Donald Trump Require Recusal in a
Clinton v. Trump Case?, ELECT!ONLAWBLOG.ORG (July 10, 2016), www.electionlawblog.org/
?p=84177.
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and strikes in the future based upon what the next president and Congress
does, [Ginsburg's remarks] strike[] me as inherently biased."s2 Because of
Ginsburg's demonstrated bias, these critics suggest that she would need to
recuse herself in future litigation involving Donald Trump, Trump's
electoral prospects, and, potentially, the Trump administration.
These are serious charges. Judicial impartiality is one of the core tenets of
a justice system, and the importance of judicial impartiality has been
recognized for centuries in American and British law. s3 As I have written
previously, "in an adversarial system like ours, where both parties are
expected to vigorously present their own cases from their own
individualized perspective, judges must remain impartial to produce a fair
result."s 4 The importance of impartiality has long been a central feature of
codes of judicial conduct. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges
and the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (upon which most state judicial
conduct codes are based) both require judges to remain impartial and to
recuse themselves if their impartiality could reasonably be challenged.ss
Biased judges must step aside on their own accord, without awaiting a
motion from the parties. 56 In short, judicial impartiality is an ethical value
of the highest order. In fact, judicial impartiality is not just an ethical rule; it
is a constitutional requirement and the foundation of the American legal
system. One of the core principles of due process is that litigants are entitled
to a neutral, impartial judge to resolve their dispute. 57 If, by commenting as

52. Benjamin Siegel, Paul Ryan Criticizes Ruth Bader Ginsburg 'Bias' in Trump
Comments, ABC NEWS (July 13, 2016), www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/paul-ryan-criticizes
ruth-bader-ginsburg-bias-trump/story?id=40535979.
53. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION (1996) (discussing the history of
judicial disqualification as a key tool to preserve judicial impartiality in England and the
United States).
54. Dmitry Barn, Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, 84 MISS. L.J. 1135, 1156
(2015).
55. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.11 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2007)
("A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."); CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon
3(C) (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 2014) ("A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in
a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.").
56. United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088, 1091 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[S]ection 455 is self
executing, requiring the judge to disqualify himself for personal bias even in the absence of a
party complaint."); see also Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 657, 675 (citing Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1200 (7th Cir. 1989)).
57. Barn, supra note 54, at 1157 ("[T]here is little dispute that the Due Process Clause
guarantees to each person an impartial tribunal in all legal proceedings, and in all phases of a
legal proceeding.").
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she did, Justice Ginsburg demonstrated the kind of bias that these ethical
rules and constitutional mandates seem to prohibit, Ginsburg's comments
would raise very serious concerns.
Fortunately, this is not the case. At the outset, it is important that the
question to be answered is framed properly. The question is not whether
Justice Ginsburg has a bias against Donald Trump in some generic sense, or
whether, in her own mind, Justice Ginsburg is predisposed against Trump
or would have preferred that Hillary Clinton won the presidential election.
Rather, the real question is whether Justice Ginsburg's comments are
problematic-whether her expression of what she was thinking raises a
separate impartiality concern. For the following reasons, the answer to that
question is no.
First, Ginsburg did nothing more than express her sincere views on
Donald Trump. To the extent that those views accurately represent her
opinions of Trump, the statements themselves do not change that reality.
When it comes to actual bias, what matters most is the judge's state of
mind, not what the litigants know about the judge's state of mind. After all,
judges must recuse themselves if they have a personal bias against a party
without awaiting a recusal motion. 58 And recusal for bias is one of the
primary criteria that requires judicial recusal. Therefore, if Ginsburg's
statements are evidence of her personal bias, then the fact that she made the
statements publicly is irrelevant. If merely believing that Donald Trump is a
"faker" or believing that he would make an unthinkably poor president
requires recusal, telling the world those thoughts does not change the
analysis. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's rejection of the notion
that mere expression of one's views-even views on legal issues that the
judge is likely to decide on the bench-creates impartiality concerns. 59
In fact, one might argue that Ginsburg's comments will help litigants
root out judicial bias more effectively than if she had concealed her
thoughts from the public. For example, in a Supreme Court case involving
Donald Trump, Trump's lawyers may try to rely on her comments to seek
Justice Ginsburg's recusal. Of course, under the Supreme Court's current
recusal procedure, Justice Ginsburg herself will decide whether recusal is
58. Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U.
L. REv. 543 n.2 (1994) ("The language of the Code leaves no doubt that, in the first instance,
the recusal process is to be self-executing, without the need for a judge to wait for a recusal
motion to be filed.").
59. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002) (striking down as
unconstitutional a provision of Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting judicial
candidates from announcing their views on legal issues likely to arise in the course of future
litigation).
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appropriate, 60 but at the very least, the litigant who questions the Justice's
impartiality can point to concrete evidence of perceived bias. Just as
learning that a judge received a campaign contribution from a party can
help the opposing party seek the judge's recusal, 61 learning that a judge has a
strong dislike of a party can help that party seek recusal.
Second, at the time of Ginsburg's comments, Donald Trump had no
pending cases before the Court. The impartiality rule has generally been
invoked when the judge in question demonstrates bias against a particular
litigant or lawyer. For example, a number of judges have been disciplined
for being biased in favor of certain attorneys or litigants, 62 but generally
only for bias that affected the judge's decisions. Some scholars have
critiqued extrajudicial speech about impending or pending cases,63 but
remarks and comments made by a judge about specific individuals, when
no case involving that individual is pending in front of the judge, have
generally not been grounds for reprimand. 64 While Ginsburg's remarks· are
unusual, they do not suggest that she has predetermined any cases involving
Donald Trump. 65
Of course, no case involving Donald Trump was pending at the time of
Ginsburg's comments, but it was at least foreseeable that a case involving
60. Each Justice decides for himself or herself whether recusal is necessary. Louis J.
Virelli III, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme Court Recusal, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1535, 1547 (2012) (explaining that each Justice makes the initial and final decision on their
own recusal).
..
61. A number of scholars have argued that more transparency is needed as to the
sources of funding in judicial elections. The public has the right to know, the argument goes,
whether the judge in question may be predisposed to rule in favor of the donor because the
judge owes a debt of gratitude to that donor. See, e.g., Debra Erenberg & Matt Berg, The Dark
Night Rises: The Growing Role ofIndependent Expenditures in Judicial Elections After Citizens
United, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501, 518 (2013).
62. GEYH, ALFINI, LUBET, & SHAMAN, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 2-47 (2010).
63. See Mark I. Harrison & Keith Swisher, When Judges Should Be Seen, Not Heard:
Extrajudicial Conduct, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 559 (2009).
64. Of course, if the judge's comments manifest improper prejudice (e.g., racial
prejudice), a judge may be reprimanded. Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm. on Performance
& Expenditure Review, 637 F.2d 1014, 1021 (5th Cir. 1981); see also In re Judicial
Misconduct, 751 F.3d 611, 623 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2014).
65. Cf GEYH, supra note 62, at 4-19 (4.07(2)) ("[W]hen a judge's remarks are so extreme
that they show that his or her decision has been predetermined, improper bias or prejudice
will be found to exist."). For example, Justice Scalia recused himself from a case involving a
challenge to the word "God" in the Pledge of Allegiance after making disparaging comments
about the case. See Charles J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, Trumped Again: The Supreme
Court Reverses the Ninth Circuit and Upholds the Pledge of Allegiance, 192 ED. L. REP. 287,
287 n.3 (2004) (discussing the reasons for Justice Scalia's recusal).
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Donald Trump would come before the Court in the near future; judges
should strive to preserve their impartiality for foreseeable cases to avoid
needless recusals. At least three kinds of cases involving Donald Trump
could emerge. First, the Court could have heard a Bush v. Gore type
challenge,66 where the Court would be asked to decide the outcome of the
presidential election. This was unlikely, but possible. In a case like this,
recusal would almost certainly be required. 67 Second, one of the candidates
could have challenged an election administration or voting rights issue that
might affect election procedure (and perhaps the results) in a particular
state. Such a suit was highly likely-after all, Voter ID, early voting, long
lines at the polls, and a myriad of other election administration issues have
generated a great deal of litigation. 68 In a case like this, depending on the
nature of the case, recusal would arguably be required. 69 Finally, the Court
could hear a case involving the Trump administration, should Donald
Trump win the election. This, at the time of Ginsburg's comments seemed
relatively unlikely, but foreseeable, whatever odds one put on the election.
Regardless, recusal would almost certainly not be required in all future
cases involving the administration. Ginsburg's views on Donald Trump, the
person, would not lead a reasonable person to question her impartiality in a
case nominally involving Donald Trump in his official capacity, or relating
to his executive policy. 70 After all, no reasonable person could believe that
66. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
67. See Cristian Farias, Did Ruth Bader Ginsburg Cross The Line With Her Donald
Trump Comments?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 11, 2016), www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ruth
bader-ginsburg-donald-trump_us_5783af3de4b0ledea78ea5c8 (comments added by Dmitry
Barn).
68. Dale E. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County: Mechanics and Standards
in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 675, 684 (2014) (discussing
extensive litigation in voting rights cases, especially in recent years).
69. I am not certain that Justice Ginsburg would have to recuse herself in every such
challenge, but at least some scholars have argued that her statements demonstrate that she is
biased in any case where Trump is a party and the Court's decision could sway the results of
the election. See, e.g., Jonathan Adler, Justice Ginsburg Fails an Important Test of Judicial
Ethics, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2016), www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy
/wp/2016/ 11/07Ijustice-ginsburg-fails-an-important-test-of-judicial-ethics/?utm_term= .3fe5
e578a753 ("Ginsburg participated in a case in which she repeatedly disparaged one of the
parties and expressed a strong preference for that party's defeat in the very election that was
the subject of the case. This was unethical of her to do. She should have recused.").
70. In denying the motion for recusal in the duck-hunting case involving Dick Cheney,
Justice Scalia emphasized that the suit against Cheney was only in his official capacity, and
therefore Justice Scalia's personal relationship with Cheney should not provide a basis for
recusal. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 915-18 (2004)
(Scalia, J., mem.).
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Justices Thomas and Scalia held no views on President Obama. Yet nobody
called for recusal of those Justices in every case involving Obama. Justice
Ginsburg's thoughts on Donald Trump's qualifications to be president are
likely not going to create bias, or even the appearance of bias, in cases
involving the Trump administration. Of course, given the nebulous recusal
standard, reasonable people can disagree with my assessments in all three
situations. But note that in all three circumstances, whether recusal is
required or not, the result does not depend on Ginsburg's comments, but
rather on her personal bias against Donald Trump. The words themselves
add little to the analysis.
Even if Ginsburg's statements alone were legally significant and could
create bias, the ethics rules offer a remedy: recusal.7 1 Recusal is not a perfect
solution of course. It is inefficient and can potentially leave the Court short
staffed to decide important cases. Recusal can also leave the Court with an
even number of justices and thus without a decision on potentially
important cases. 72 In addition, recusal may fail to eliminate the appearance
of bias created by the speech since it may fail to undo the damage created by
the original comments. 73 Recusal is particularly problematic in the case of
the Supreme Court because the Justices decide their own recusal motions. 74
And to make matters worse, there is no appellate review of Supreme Court
decisions, meaning that each Justice's decision on their own bias is the final
decision. But despite all the doctrinal shortcomings, recusal is at least a
partial remedy to address impartiality concerns that result from judicial
speech. 75
It is plausible that whatever Ginsburg may think of Trump, the
statements themselves may actually make her more biased. Perhaps merely
expressing her views makes those views stronger. If partisan judicial speech
actually reinforces or strengthens the judge's views, then Ginsburg's
comments become more problematic. In that case, the very act of speaking
creates the bias. And studies have shown that expressing an opinion often
71. See supra note 55 (discussing the impartiality provisions in the Code of Conduct for
U.S. Judges and the Model Code ofJudicial Conduct).
72. At the time Ginsburg made her comments, the Court was already down to eight
members with the recent passing of Justice Scalia. Were Ginsburg to recuse herself, the
Court would once again have been down to an odd number of justices.
73. Dmitry Barn, Making Appearance Matter, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 943 (2011).
74. Barn, supra note 54, at 1136-38.
75. In Republican Party of Minn. v. White, Justice Kennedy suggested that states may
use more stringent recusal rules to address impartiality concerns that arise from judicial
speech announcing views on legal issues. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S.
765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
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solidifies it. 76 Therefore, there is a risk that when judges express their views
about an individual, they will tend to stick to them even in the face of
evidence to the contrary. 77 To make matters worse, the judge in question
might feel the pressure to demonstrate her impartiality, thus being unduly
predisposed to rule against her earlier comments.
While these arguments have some merit these concerns are minor for
Supreme Court Justices generally, and Justice Ginsburg in particular. After
all, Supreme Court Justices come to the Court with a lifetime of experience
and well-established views; they are selected for their seats largely because
of their experience and expertise. 78 For individuals with such strongly-held
views, concern about anchoring is minimized. Justice Ginsburg, for
example, had spent her career fighting against many of the things for which
Donald Trump stands. She was appointed by a Democratic president and
has consistently been one of the most liberal justices on the Court. All these
factors suggest that the risk of her cementing her views by speaking out
against Trump is minimal. Her partisan ideology was already well
cemented at the time that she made her comments, and it seems unlikely
that the mere expression of her thoughts (rather than the thoughts
themselves) on this occasion would influence her decisions in any future
case.
B. Appearance ofBias

So far, this Article has discussed whether Ginsburg's comments violated
the ethical requirement that judges remain impartial. But even if Ginsburg's
comments are not problematic when it comes to actual bias, the concern
about the appearance of bias still looms. A number of scholars have pointed
76. For example, psychologists have identified a commitment bias, which is "the
tendency to be consistent with what we have already done or said we will do in the past,
particularly if this is public." Commitment Bias, THE ASSOCIATION FOR QUALITATIVE
RESEARCH, https://www.aqr.org.uk/glossary/commitment-bias (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
Because nobody wants to appear inconsistent, the concern is that Justice Ginsberg would feel
the obligation to decide cases in accordance with previously expressed views. See also Donald
C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock
Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 142 (1997).
77. Justice Stevens made similar arguments in his Republican Party of Minn. v. White
dissent. He argued that when judges announce their views in the course of judicial election
campaigns, they then feel a duty to follow those announcements. See Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 799-801 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 830, 831, 835 (1972) ("Since most Justices come to this
bench no earlier than their middle years, it would be unusual if they had not by that time
formulated at least some tentative notions which would influence them in the interpretation
of the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their interaction with one another.").
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out that appearances are important for the judiciary. 79 In fact, the Court has
hinted that even the appearance of impartiality may fall within the ambit of
the Due Process Clause. 80 Some of Ginsburg's critics have emphasized just
this point: "[The] illusion of impartiality has long been crucial to how the
Supreme Court operates." 81 Truly appearances are important, but
Ginsburg's comments did not damage the "illusion of impartiality." In fact,
Ginsburg's comments may have even strengthened the "illusion of
impartiality."
Suppose that Ginsburg's comments demonstrate that she is actually
biased. If that is the case, then the appearance-based argument largely
collapses. After all, as mentioned above, statements demonstrating the
judge's actual bias benefit litigants and the public. 82 Appearance of
impartiality is important to further the reality of impartiality, not to conceal
true bias. There is no compelling (or even legitimate) reason to create an ·
appearance of impartiality solely to cover up actual bias by a judge.
While there is no bright-line test to determine whether a reasonable
person would consider Ginsburg to be biased against Donald Trump in a
future case involving Trump, it is at least questionable whether expressing
her views about Trump's qualifications for the presidency creates an
appearance of bias. As explained earlier, this is particularly true because
there were no cases involving Trump before the Court when the comments
were made. Furthermore, recusal would still have been an option if such a
case arose. Judges must not appear biased towards a litigant or a lawyer in a
case. 83 Trump was neither. 84
Finally, the appearance-based standard considers the views of "a
reasonably informed person." And a reasonably informed person would (or
79. Thomas R. Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges and Fair Appeals for
Litigants: Judicial Recusal in A Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REv. 691, 709 (2007)
(discussing the importance of the appearance of impartiality).
80. Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their Impartiality Might
Reasonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond A Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ. L. REv. 411, 432
(2014) ("It may be that by ensuring an impartial judge in fact, the Due Process Clause fosters
the appearance of impartiality and thereby builds public confidence in the judiciary.").
81. Libby Nelson, The Controversy Over Ruth Bader Ginsburg Attacking Donald Trump,
Explained, Vox (July 14, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2016/7/12/12160862/ginsburg-trump
controversy.
82. See supra Part III.A.
83. See supra note 55.
84. It is important to distinguish the "appearance of impartiality" argument from the
appearance of impropriety argument we will address in 11.B, below. When it comes to
appearance of impropriety, judges must avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety "in all the judges' activities." GEYH, supra note 62, § 1.04.
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should) know that Justice Ginsburg, a reliable left-leaning voice on the
Court, a trailblazer for women's rights, and an icon in progressive circles,
likely supported Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump in the presidential
election. To the extent that this fact would be obvious to any reasonable
observer, Ginsburg's statements do nothing more than confirm that
intuition. In addition, a reasonable person should recognize that judges
have strongly-held political views, and that those views may influence
judicial decisions. Term after term, the Court has decided a number of
controversial cases by a 5-4 margin, with the two blocs-liberal and
conservative-uniformly voting together. 85 In a sense, this challenge is very
much like the challenge to Justice Scalia's impartiality following his duck
hunting trip with Dick Cheney. 86 At the time, Cheney was a named party in
a case pending at the Supreme Court. 87 Justice Scalia rejected calls for his
recusal. 88 In a 21-page memorandum, he concluded that no "reasonable
observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances"
would conclude that he was biased towards his good friend and
acquaintance. 89 Scalia made an important distinction between his personal
friendship with Cheney and his appearance in the lawsuit in his official
capacity. 90 Just as a close friendship between a Justice and a President (or a
presidential candidate) may not create the appearance of bias, the absolute
opposite-a dislike of a President or a presidential candidate-may also not
suffice to establish an appearance of bias.91

85. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman, Do the Justices Vote Like Policy Makers? Evidence from
Scaling the Supreme Court with Interest Groups, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 285 (2015) ("The
sharp divide between the two blocs reflects the fact that 13 of the 26 nonunanimous cases
were decided by the standard 5-4 split with the conservatives supporting the Chamber or 5-3
with one liberal justice recused.").
86. For a summary of the incident, including a discussion of the ethical issues raised, see
Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia's Memorandum in the Cheney Case,
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229 (2004). See also Timothy J. Goodson, Duck, Duck, Goose:
Hunting for Better Recusal Practices in the United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney v.
United States District Court, 84 N.C. L. REV. 181, 182 (2005).
87. Goodson, supra note 86, at 182.
88. Id. at 182-83.
89. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.). In his
memorandum, Justice Scalia offered his own factual account of the events, as well as his legal
argument for why recusal was not necessary. Id. at 914-15.
90. Id.
91. This analysis assumes that Justice Scalia decided the recusal issue correctly. I take no
sides on whether this is the case. Instead, this paragraph is intended to show that under the
Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, there is a strong argument that Justice Ginsburg's
comments do not create an appearance of bias.
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Finally, I want to point out that Justice Ginsburg, later in the election
cycle, decided a case involving Donald Trump as a litigant. 92 In that case,
the Ohio Democratic Party sought to enjoin the Trump campaign from
improper voter intimidation. 93 After Ohio courts denied the injunction, the
Supreme Court heard the Ohio Democratic Party's application to reinstate
the injunction. 94 While some have argued that her participation in the case
was improper,95 Justice Ginsburg rejected the Ohio Democratic Party's
appeal and even wrote separately to explain her vote in favor of Donald
Trump. 96 Arguably, such a vote against her own political views actually
improves public confidence in her impartiality and the respect for judicial
impartiality more generally. It shows to a reasonable observer that judges do
not simply vote according to their partisan views. In other words,
Ginsburg's comments, and comments like hers, may actually foster, not
undermine, the public's view of the Court as an impartial institution once
the public sees that judges do not simply decide cases according to their
political preferences.
Overall, partisan judicial statements, like the ones made by Justice
Ginsburg, raise some impartiality concerns. This is particularly true if the
statements create a "commitment bias" effect solidifying the Justice's views,
thus making it more difficult for a judge to rule for (or against) a litigant. In
addition, to the extent that some members of the public question any future
decision against the litigant, regardless of the legal correctness of the ruling,
this appearance of bias leads to a loss of confidence in the court. There is no
denying that these are legitimate concerns. But for the reasons discussed
above, I believe that these impartiality-based concerns are fairly minor. So
let us now turn to the second criticism.

92. Ohio Democratic Partyv. Trump, 137 S. Ct. 15 (2016) (mem.).
93. Ohio Democratic Party v. Ohio Republican Party, No. 16-CV-02645, 2016 WL
6542486, at *l (N.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2016).
94. Ohio Democratic Partyv. Trump, 137 S. Ct. 15 (2016) (mem.).
95. See Jonathan Adler, Justice Ginsburg Fails an Important Test of Judicial Ethics,
WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2016/11/07/justice-ginsburg-fails-an-important-test-of-judicial-ethics/?utm_term=.fal16cl 0
3ea3.
96. See Adam Liptak, Justices Won't Revive Order Barring Voter Intimidation in Ohio,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/us/politics/supreme-court
donald-trump-ohio.html?_r=O.
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IV. THE POLITICS CRITIQUE97

In addition to prohibiting judicial speech that raises questions about
judicial impartiality, the rules restrict judges from engaging in political
speech and association. 98 The most relevant ethical canon bans judges from
publicly supporting or opposing a candidate for non-judicial office. 99 And
this is precisely the rule that Justice Ginsburg's leading critics cite. For
example, Stephen Gillers, one of the top legal ethics experts in the nation,
wrote that Justice Ginsburg's comments would have violated the rule that
judges should not "make speeches for a political candidate, or publicly
endorse or oppose a candidate for public office" or "engage in any other
political activity." 100 Just as with the impartiality critique, there are two
variants on the "politics critique." First, the politics critique argues that
partisan judicial speech detracts from the apolitical, independent role that
judges are expected to play. Second, the politics critique posits that partisan
speech erodes the public's respect for the Court and its judgments by
gutting the appearance of nonpartisanship. Once again, I will discuss both
arguments in turn.
A. Actual Politics at the Court

The first variant of this critique is that judges should remain apolitical at
all times. 101 Justice Ginsburg's comments enmesh her, and the Supreme

97. In this section, I also consider the general critique that Justice Ginsburg's statements
create the appearance of impropriety. Ultimately, I believe the appearance of impropriety
critique is just the politics critique under another name. Likewise, somebody may criticize
Justice Ginsburg for lending the prestige of judicial office to oppose a candidate in the
election. This, too, is nothing more than the politics critique in disguise.
98. See Michael Richard Dimino, Sr., Counter-Majoritarian Power and Judges' Political
Speech, 58 FLA. L. REv. 53, 54 (2006). Additional rules regarding the way that judges run their
campaigns restrict the political speech of elected judges. Id. at n.6.
99. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 5(A)(l)(b) (AM. BARAss'N 2011).
100. Stephen Gillers, It's Clearly Not Right for Justices to Say Which Candidate They
Support, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/
07I12/ can-a-supreme-court-justice-denounce-a-candidate/its-clearly-not-right-for-justices
to-say-which-candidate-they-support (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON
5). Gillers acknowledges, and laments, that the Canons do not apply to Supreme Court
Justices. Id.
101. Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 391 (1997) ("[C]ourts should deliver authoritative
interpretations because they, unlike Congress or the executive, are apolitical."); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., "Announcement" by Federal Judicial Nominees, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1281, 1287
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Court, in politics. 102 As a result, Justice Ginsburg either violated a direct
prohibition on engaging in politics, or a more general rule that judges must
act properly and protect public confidence in the courts. 103 There is no
denying that Justice Ginsburg's speech is political and partisan in nature,
and that it essentially amounts to an endorsement of Hillary Clinton in the
presidential election. Accepting these premises, let us explore whether such
speech should be prohibited.
First, contrary to the assertions of many scholars 104 and often the Justices
themselves, 105 the Supreme Court was not designed to be an apolitical
institution. Unlike the requirement that judges remain impartial, there is no
constitutional dimension to judicial nonpartisanship. In fact, the
constitutional structure belies the argument that the judiciary is apolitical.
For example, the Justices are appointed via an intensely political process by
the President and through the Senate. 106 This appointment process is exactly
the same as the process for appointing other political officers. 107 And
although judicial appointments have been political since the founding,1° 8 in

(2004) (discussing the norm that judges do not make campaign speeches in order to preserve
the apolitical nature of the judiciary).
102. In this Article, I do not discuss whether the ban on political activity violates the First
Amendment. First, because the Code of Conduct does not apply to Supreme Court Justices,
Justice Ginsburg could not be reprimanded or punished for her speech. Second, the more
interesting question I seek to address is whether such restrictions are normatively proper and
beneficial, rather than whether they are constitutional. Recent cases have addressed the
constitutionality of endorsement clauses. See Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir.
2010) (upholding the Wisconsin endorsement clause); Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010 (8th
Cir. 2012) (upholding Minnesota's endorsement clause).
103. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2011) ("A judge
shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.").
104. For example, Stephen Gillers argues that "the structure of the U.S. Constitution
makes the judiciary the nonpolitical branch of government. The executive and legislature are
the political branches. Members of Congress and presidents have constituents and seek
votes. Federal judges do not." Stephen Gillers, It's Clearly Not Right for Justices to Say Which
Candidate They Support, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/room
fordebate/2016/07 / l 2/ can-a-supreme-court-justice-denounce-a-candidate/ its-clearly-not
right- for-justices-to-say-which-candidate- they-support.
105. See generally Hazard, supra note 101 (suggesting that the judiciary is the apolitical
branch).
106. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2; STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS
(1994).
107. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
108. For example, following the election of 1800, John Adams and the federalists created
a number of new judgeships and appointed federalists into those seats.
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recent years judicial appointments have become even more politicized. 109 In
fact, the Supreme Court was explicitly made an election issue by Donald
Trump himself when he argued that the voters will decide who replaces
Justice Scalia on the Court. 110 This political nature of the Court is no bug-it
is a feature of the system. The Court was designed to play a critical check on
the other branches of government, and in that sense, the Court is just as
representative of the people as the other two branches, standing between the
people and their representativesY 1 The President and the Senate
understand that judges do not just call balls and strikes (since the identity of
the umpire matters less) but actually write the rules. Judges time their
retirement to coincide with their political party being able to appoint and
confirm a replacement. 112 A constitutional system where Justices are
appointed through a political process and strategically retire to allow a
President from their preferred party to make a new appointment is no
model of an apolitical judiciary. Thus, the assumption that underlies
Stephen Gillers's argument-the assumption that we must keep judges out
of politics-is wrong. To the contrary, we have created and retained a
political judiciary.
Second, not only is the process of appointing judges a political one, but
the Justices are not apolitical when they are on the Court. Some scholars
have even argued that the Supreme Court is not a court, in part because the
Justices' decisions are often not constrained by the "law." 113 As Judge
Richard Posner explains, the idea that the other two branches are political
but the Court is apolitical is nonsense. 114 Proving that ideology and politics
play a role in judicial decision-making is beyond the scope of this Article,
109. David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1033, 1033 (2008); see NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND
THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 1 (2005) (demonstrating the
politicization of the appointment process for even lower court judges in the last few
decades).
110. See Donald Trump, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention (July
21, 2016) (transcript available at http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript
donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974) ("The replacement for Justice
Scalia will be a person of similar views and principles. This will be one of the most important
issues decided by this election.").
111. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
112. There is little question that Justices Stevens and Souter would not have retired under
a Republican president, for example, or that Justice O'Connor would not have retired under
a Democratic president.
113. See ERIC SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS ix, 187 (2012).
114. Richard Posner, What is Obviously Wrong With the Federal Judiciary, Yet Eminently
Curable, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 187, 200 (2016).
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and it has been the subject of a long and vigorous debate in the academic
literature.us But in this day where everyone is a legal realist, 116 we have
generally accepted that judicial decisions are not "law all the way down." 117
Judges' ideology and political beliefs play a critical role in judicial decisions.
An overwhelming amount of legal scholarship supports that partisanship
is an important factor in judicial decisions. us This is particularly true in
constitutional litigation, where judges are even more likely to advance their
own ideology because the constitutional text offers so few constraints. 119
Almost no view of the Constitution is "off the wall" today. 120 And because
the Supreme Court chooses its own docket, the Court hears many
constitutional cases (and ultimately decides them along party lines).
Constitutional cases do not have a clear "legal" answer. 121 Either due to the
vagueness of the language typically used in constitutional texts, or the
antiquity of the constitutional text, constitutional cases are often
"indeterminate"-in other words, they cannot be answered by mere
recourse to text, history, or precedent. As a result, these decisions are
especially likely to turn on the judges' ideology, background, politics, and
other factors. Even in non-constitutional cases, the Court is more likely to
pick difficult cases that have divided lower courts and have no clear "right"

115. See infra note 118.
116. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 385 (1990) ("[W]e are all legal realists.").
117. This phrase was famously used by Justice Kagan during her confirmation hearings.
See Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J.L. & POL'Y 123, 135
(2011).
118. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 369 (2008); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 430 (2002);
Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457,
1514-15 (2003) (concluding that political factors influence judicial decisions, although legal
factors having the greatest impact); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 761-62 (2008) (presenting empirical evidence
showing that political preferences influence judicial review of agency decisions); Richard L.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1717
19 (1997) (demonstrating that ideology influences judicial decisions).
119. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision
Making, 86 AM. POL. Ser. REV. 323, 324-26 (1992). See generally Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M.
Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. &
0RG. 276, 292 (2007).
120. Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24
0SGOODE HALL L.J. 353 (1986).
121. Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. & MARYL. REv. 667,
672 (2015) ("The Constitution's text is famously underdeterminate.").
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answer. 122 It is not just American scholars who recognize that judging and
politics are often bedfellows. 123 And a number of judges have admitted that
many cases cannot be decided without at least some reference to ideology. 124
The idea that judging occupies an entirely distinct sphere than politics is
belied by the nation's history. Early in this nation's history, Federalist
Justices campaigned for John Adams. 125 Chief Justice Burger discussed legal
matters with President Nixon, 126 as had Justice Fortas with President
Johnson. 127 President Franklin Roosevelt and President Truman also had
close ties to the Court. 128 In addition, many Justices had political careers
before joining the bench. 129 In other words, judging and politics have long
gone hand in hand.
The idea that judging would be sullied if politics entered the equation
ignores the reality that judges are very high-level government officers who
often make decisions based on values and political judgments. This is
especially true for Supreme Court Justices whose decisions are not even
reviewed by any other judges. The Supreme Court has changed course
many times throughout its history, often based merely on the change in
membership of the Court. And with the confirmation of now Justice
Gorsuch, the law will almost certainly go in a different direction than it
122. In fact, that's one of the criteria for granting certiorari. See Ryan Stephenson, Federal
Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 274
(2013) (discussing the criteria governing the certiorari process).
123. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 34 (2005) ("What matters for the reality oflegal life is who decides.").
124. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 118.
125. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 333, 368 n.135 (1998) (citing Mark A. Graber,
Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 229 (1998)).
126. See Fred Barbash, Ehrlichman Tells of Nixon, Burger Talks, WASH. POST (1981),
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/12/10/ehrlichman-tells-of-nixon-burger
talks/3cb9fl 5 f-432f-4de3-99e0- fc705ce873b8/?utm_ term=.5 l l b5fe6b870.
127. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 293-320, 351 (1990).
128. Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters: The Court's Fateful Turn in Ex
Parle Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REV. 153, 218 (2013) ("All of Roosevelt's
appointees had significant ties to the President."); David Rudenstine, The Irony ofA Faustian
Bargain: A Reconsideration of the Supreme Court's 1953 United States v. Reynolds Decision,
34 CARDOZO L. REv. 1283, 1381-82 (2013) (discussing the relationship between President
Truman and Justice Vinson).
129. For example, Justice Warren previously served as the Governor of California, and
Justice Black served as a Senator. A. E. Dick Howard, The Constitution and the Role of
Government, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 449, 460 (2012) (discussing the political experiences of a
number ofJustices).
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would have under a Justice Garland. In other words, the politics of
affirmative action, abortion, campaign finance, immigration, and many
other core political topics depends on the politics of our President, the
politics of the Senate, and ultimately, the politics of the Supreme Court
Justices themselves.
In addition, judges are not historians, sociologists, or anthropologists.
This means that their decisions are not typically constrained by science or
facts. As Judge Posner explains, "[t]he perception of the Court as a political
court in most constitutional cases and many nonconstitutional ones derives
from the fact that the Justices form confident views without any empirical
basis for them." 130 This again goes back to how we select judges and the
background of the Supreme Court Justices. "In default of empirical or
otherwise objective knowledge people rely on their intuition, which is
shaped by ideology [], temperament, race and sex, upbringing, and other
personal characteristics." 131 These concerns are amplified because the Court
decides fewer cases than it had for most of its history. As a result, the Court
makes more grand announcements that are more and more legislative in
nature. 132 This means that the line between the judicial and other branches
has become more blurred than ever before.
Steve Lubet, an author of the leading treatise on judicial ethics, 133 accepts
that judges may have political views, but says that we still expect judges to
put their political opinions aside when they decide cases. 134 This is likely
true, although many scholars and judges agree that many of the decisions at
the Supreme Court are influenced by the Justices' politics. 135 But even
putting that aside, nothing that Justice Ginsburg said indicates that she
would not decide cases, even those involving Donald Trump, fairly. After
all, other Justices have been able to set aside their feelings about the
individual holding office to decide cases fairly and impartially. Lubet, in
fact, offers his own examples of Justices doing so, including Justice
Roberts' s vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. 136
If we believe Justices can put aside their political views, the mere fact that
130. RICHARD POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 83 (2013).
131. Id.
132. POSNER, supra note ll8, at 270-71.
133. See generally CHARLES GERDNER GEYH, JAMES J. ALFINI, STEVEN LUBET, & JEFFREY
SHAMAN, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (5th ed. 2013).
134. See Steve Lubet, Tushnet -- and Feldman -- on Ginsburg, FACULTY LOUNGE (July 13,
2016), www.thefacultylounge.org/2016/07 /tushnet-on-ginsburg.html.
135. See Stras, supra note 109, at 1033.
136. See Lubet, supra note 134. ("If you don't believe that judges can put politics aside, at
least now and then, how do you explain Justice Roberts's vote in the ACA cases?").
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those views have been spoken does not mean that they cannot be cabined
just as they would otherwise have been. 137
B.

Appearance ofPolitics

For the same reason that judges must appear to be impartial, judges must
also appear to behave properly. 138 Appearances are at the heart of the
judicial codes of conduct because of the rules' concern about the public's
faith and confidence in the judiciary. "The public will not support
institutions in which they have no confidence. The need for public support
and confidence is all the more critical for the judicial branch, which by
virtue of its independence is less directly accountable to the electorate and,
thus, perhaps more vulnerable to public suspicion." 139 So did Justice
Ginsburg's statements harm that perception of the judiciary? Did her
statements create an appearance of impropriety?
The strongest version of this argument was made by Rick Hasen and
Dahlia Lithwick. Hasen and Lithwick acknowledge that "judges have
political opinions,'' but claim that "it is better for their own legitimacy and
the integrity of our elections to keep the judicial and political roles
separate." 140 And in fact, when candidates for judicial office have challenged
the ban on judges endorsing or opposing other candidates for office, lower
courts have upheld such bans. 141 Their chief concern, then, is not that such
political speech turns judges into politicians, but rather about the legitimacy
of the judiciary when judges engage in such political activity. 142 While the
concerns about appearances are an important consideration, there are a few
reasons to believe that those concerns are overblown when it comes to
Justice Ginsberg's comments.
137. Lubet argues that "(w]hen a [J]ustice begins campaigning for or against a candidate .
. . it means that she has stopped trying [to put politics aside.]" Id. But it is unclear why this is
necessarily the case. Perhaps the fact that Justice Ginsburg chose to express her views shows
how strongly she believes in them, but I do not read Ginsburg's comments to suggest that
she would not set those views aside to decide cases on their merits.
138. Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the American Bar Association
Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, AM. BAR. Ass'N 10 (July 2003),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/ dam/ aba/migrated/judind/ jeopardy/pdf/report.authch
eckdam.pdf.
139. Id.
140. Hasen & Lithwick, supra note 41.
141. See Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F. 3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2016).
142. Hasen & Lithwick, supra note 41 (arguing that the ban is necessary to "preserve the
impression that judges can rise above politics for a larger interest: the interest in a neutral,
independent judicial branch") (emphasis added).
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First, as mentioned above, Justice Ginsberg did nothing more than tell us
what she was thinking, and perhaps nothing more than what we already
knew. There is an important difference between merely expressing your
own political views and engaging in partisan activity. For example, a
number of Justices have been criticized for attending partisan or semi
partisan events like meetings of the Federalist Society or the American
Constitution Society or partisan fundraisers. 143 There, the concern is that
the Justices are becoming exposed to a one-sided view, or further cementing
their connection to a particular partisan belief. Judges should not be
engaged in partisan or political groups because that involvement can
actually change their world-view and approach in cases. But mere
expression has much less risk. 144 Is there a compelling need to preserve the
appearance of nonpartisanship and the "legitimacy of the Court" when
judges have strong partisan views? Arguably, the answer is no. If judges are
silent because they have no strongly held political views, or because their
strongly held views do not influence their decisions, then such imposed
silence is important. But appearances are only important insofar as they
further reality and should not be used to deceive the public. And as we
discussed earlier, judges do have strongly held views and those views indeed
play a role in judicial decision-making.
Take, for example, the use of appearances in Part III to preserve the
appearance of impartiality. There, appearances are important to ensure the
judges are not only actually unbiased but do not appear to be biased. But
appearances are not used to conceal actual bias by judges; biased judges are
also required to recuse, and I am not aware of any scholar arguing that the
appearance of impartiality is important so that litigants are not aware that
judges are actually not impartial. Similarly, in the election context, the
Court has suggested that government can regulate campaign finance to
eliminate the appearance of corruption. 145 The reason is that the appearance
of corruption can lead to a general distrust in the political process and our
elected officials. But the Court has never suggested that appearance of
purity is important to conceal the reality of actual corruption.
Most constitutional scholars have accepted that Supreme Court Justices
are influenced by their politics, upbringing, experiences, family, and many

143. See Justices Thomas and Scalia Violate Judicial Ethics by Headlining Right Wing
Fundraisers, Pouncus USA (Nov. 16, 2013), www.politicususa.com/2013/11/16/justices
thomas-scalia-violate-judicial-ethics-headlining-wing-fundraisers.html.
144. The risk is still present. See supra Part III.B.
145. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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other factors. 146 Yet they continue to insist that judges cannot tell the people
what's on their minds. 147 This use of appearances seems particularly
problematic, especially because the judiciary is, in a sense, representative of
the people. 148 We have generally rejected the notion that public opinion of a
government institution must be preserved at all costs, even by concealing
reality from the people. 149
Admittedly, without comments like those made by Justice Ginsburg, the
only people who will be aware that judges have strong political inclinations
are those that closely follow the work of the court, or those who read the
academic literature on judicial decision-making. To that extent, the ethical
restrictions on judicial speech may, in fact, further the goal of maintaining
the impression for a majority of the population that judges have no strong
political leanings. But there is no compelling interest in preserving the
appearance of an apolitical judiciary if that does not reflect reality. Justice
Ginsburg's comments can educate a generally uninformed electorate that
judges are human beings and have strong political leanings.
The best way to demonstrate that those political beliefs are not the sole
motivating factor for judicial decisions is not to hide the beliefs, but to show
the public that judges frequently decide cases contrary to their own beliefs.
Understanding that judges have strongly, passionately-held political views
may even affirm the public's understanding that the judiciary is, in some
ways, different from the other branches. Judges do not just decide cases
solely according to their politics. Sure, their politics are relevant, but not to
all cases. There are many other factors that often enter their analysis. Thus,
while a politician may generally vote according to his political beliefs, a
judge will often vote against his political beliefs. 15° Knowing that a judge is
146. See Stras, supra note 109, at 1078.
147. See supra Part II.
148. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
149. That notion was not always and universally rejected. For example, England's
seditious libel laws punished even true libelous speech that damaged the reputation of the
government. See 5 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-5 (2d ed. 2003) ("If
people should not be called to account for possessing the people with an ill opinion of the
government, no government can subsist. For it is very necessary for all governments that the
people should have a good opinion of it.").
150. John C. Yoo, In Defense of A Political Court, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1436, 1467 (2000)
(reviewing TERRI J. PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (2000)) ("Some cases where
Justices probably voted against their preferences on the merits of the public policy issues at
stake include Justice Scalia in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (concerning flag
burning), ChiefJustice Rehnquist in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (concerning the
authority of independent counsel), and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (concerning abortion).").
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doing so helps reaffirm the view that judges are not entirely driven by their
partisanship.
Second, while the public is generally ignorant about judges, 151 they are
not so ignorant as to entirely accept the notion that judges are apolitical,
nonpartisan creatures. For example, judges in most states are elected
officials and run in increasingly competitive judicial election campaigns. 152
They have seen political decisions from Bush v. Gore, 153 to Roe v. Wade, 154 to
Citizens United v. FEC. 155 In fact, most high-profile issues today are decided
along party lines. In addition, the public sees the politicized nomination
process. They see that judges leave the bench for Presidents they like and
stay on the Court for Presidents they disagree with. These battles for Court
seats also show that political involvement is not inconsistent with the
traditional judicial role. Admittedly, the founders adopted life tenure in
large part to insulate judges from politics and ensure judicial independence.
But Justice Ginsburg's statements do not make her less independent. And
we now know that no selection mechanism-or at least no mechanism used
in the United States-can completely insulate judges from politics.
Third, in recent years, Supreme Court Justices have become more
outspoken about political issues. Many have expressed their political views
in their opinions. 156 Justices are often invited to speak at events sponsored
by quasi-partisan organizations like the Federalist Society and the American
Constitution Society. 157 Justice Ginsburg's comments are perhaps different
in degree, but not necessarily in kind from what Justices have done in recent
years.

151. See, e.g., ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE (2016).
152. See generally JED SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS (2012) (discussing the
prevalence of judicial elections throughout the United States).
153. See generally David Margolick, The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 19, 2014),
http://www.vanityfair.com/ news/2004/ 10/ florida-election- 2000.
154. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
155. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
156. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Scalia Must Resign, WASH. POST (June 27, 2012),
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-jr-justice-scalia-should-resign/2012/06/27 I
gJQApk006V_story.html.
157. Richard L. Hasen, Celebrity Justice Supreme Court Edition, 19 GREEN BAG 2d 157
(2016) ("Supreme Court Justices are in the news more than ever, whether they are selling
books, testifying before Congress, addressing a Federalist Society or American Constitution
Society event, or just talking to a Muppet on Sesame Street.").
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Fourth, perhaps the concern about appearance itself is overvalued. There
is also little threat that the courts will collapse. 158 Legitimacy of the Court
does not depend on appearance that it is completely apolitical. 159 The Court
has a reservoir of good will, and its legitimacy is judged by its decisions and
processes. 160 "The Court's overall support thus remains high, not because
the public exempts the Court's decisions from its political value judgments,
but rather because the Court issues decisions that satisfy the political
preferences of enough different groups at different times." 161 To the extent
that the Court's reputation may be damaged by the public's greater
knowledge that judges have political viewpoints and that those viewpoints
may influence decisions, (a) that is not necessarily a bad thing, and (b) it
may also be helped by this knowledge. 162 Nonetheless, a rich literature, in
law and political science, has shown that the support for the judiciary is
strong despite the fact that many people perceive Justices as being strongly
motivated by politics. 163
V. CONCLUSION

I want to conclude by looking at the implications of my argument. If
judicial speech by Supreme Court Justices is not as problematic as the
reaction to Justice Ginsburg's comments suggests, perhaps it is time we
reconsider our ethical rules and norms, if not for all judges, but for Supreme
Court Justices. The idea that ethics rules should be tailored to the Court has
received little attention, but the Supreme Court is a much different
institution than that of a federal district court, so perhaps speech rules for

158. Michael Dimino, Public Confidence and Judicial Campaigns, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 705,
713-14 (2010).
159. James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural
Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 L. & Soc'y REV. 469, 471 (1989); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth
Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S.
Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 L. & Soc'y REv. 621, 621-22 (1991).
160. See generally Lori A. Ringhand & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Functioning Just Fine: The
Unappreciated Value of the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 61 DRAKE L. REv. 1025
(2013).
161. Id. at 1045.
162. Or Bassok, The Supreme Court's New Source ofLegitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153
(2013).
163. But see James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the
Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 L. &Soc'YREV. 195, 213 (2011); Adam Liptak & Allison
Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-americans-approve-of-supreme
court-in-new-poll.html ?pagewanted=all.
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Supreme Court Justices should be different as well. And if partisan speech
by Supreme Court Justices indeed causes little harm and has some potential
benefits, perhaps the ethics rules should encourage judges to speak their
mind.

